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THIS CHAPTER GIVES a description and interpretation of the behavior
of unfilled orders in relation to shipments and other measures of in-
dustrial activity, beginning with a formulation of some expectations
about these relations.
For goods made to order and subject to fluctuations in sales and de-
livery periods, new orders might be expected to lead unfilled orders.
This hypothesis is based on a generalization of the following cyclical
pattern: (1) In expansions, N first rises and then declines, moving
throughout above the level of S. which increases steadily. (2) In con-
tractions, symmetrically, N first declines and then rises, moving
throughout below the level of S, which decreases steadily. It follows
that U increases in expansions and decreases in contractions, since
N > S during the former and N <S during the latter. This implies a
lag of U behind N at both peaks and troughs, and suggests the likeli-
hood of a roughly coincident timing of U and S.1 This rests on two
assumptions: that new orders have larger fluctuations than shipments,
and that they turn ahead of shipments. These should be safe premises
to make in the case of manufacture to order and, as already shown, the
data bear them out for a variety of industries and products. However,
they are not the only relevant facts. Backlog movements, especially
when they are large, can themselves strongly influence the scheduling
of production and hence the timing of output and shipments.
Using the symbols introduced earlier, this typical turning-point sequence would be written as
NU, S(with the arrow pointing from the leader to the lagger and the comma denoting roughly
coincident timing). IfS turned down beforeN fellbelow the level of S, Uwouldlag behind S at the
peak; if S turned down afterthathappened, Uwouldlead S (and an analogous statement applies,
mutatismutandis, atthe trough). Unless the discrepancies between N and S are quite large, the
timing differences between U and S are not likely to be very great either.246 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Where backlogs are small, either because the typical delivery periods
are short or because production is largely to stock or both, they are also
likely to behave less systematically, and their relation to shipments may
be quite loose. S would then follow N with a short lag and might turn
ahead of U (instead of together with or after U, as was assumed be-
fore). On the other hand, where delivery periods are long and backlogs
large, production is to a large extent concerned with orders on hand and
correspondingly less dependent on currently received (new) orders.
Shipments and output are here closely correlated; therefore, S, too,
would be relatively more responsive to U and less to N. Given a
large backlog just accumulated, one would expect the lags of S relative
to U to be pronounced on the downgrade, since an ample stock of
orders can sustain production for some time, even when new orders are
declining.
An Historical Survey of the Principal Evidence
Data for Steel, 1902—33
The earliest historical series on unfilled orders is that of the United
States Steel Corporation. The published figures (1902—33) have been
regarded as "accurate barometers of the trend of the steel industry
and even of general business conditions." 2Inpart, their prestige was
undoubtedly derived from that of U.S. Steel as the industry leader and
was aided by the paucity of available rival indicators. But, some over-
stated language aside, this series is indeed worthy of considerable
attention as a tool of analysis; and it certainly could have been quite
helpful to contemporaries as a smooth and highly sensitive cyclical
indicator with roughly coincident or slightly leading timing character-
istics.
No shipments series to match the U.S. Steel backlog data is avail-
able, but steel production has long been measured by the output of
ingots as they come from the hearth or converter. Accordingly, Chart
6-1 presents the two series after seasonal adjustments and in the usual
form suitable for cyclical comparisons: The dots denote the peaks and
2Quoted from a description in Bureau of the Census, RecordBook ofBusinessStatistics, Par:Ii,





































































































































































































































































































































































y248 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
troughs of the series; shadowed areas in the background denote gen-
eral business recessions.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the specific cycles in
the two steel series; both unfilled orders and production rose in each
business expansion and declined in each contraction. Steel backlogs
led output at eight peaks and coincided with output at one. One of
these leads, in 1917—18, at the end of World War I, was very long
(19 months). This could have been a consequence of the massive back-
log accumulation that had occurred at an earlier period when strong
demand pressures caused capacity shortages. The other leads at
peaks were all short: three of one month each and three of two to four
months. At troughs, there were four coincidences, three leads, and
two long lags. On the average, backlogs had a short lead relative to
production at peaks and nearly synchronous timing at troughs: The
means are —3.9 and +0.6; the medians, —1.5 and 0 months.
After the war, unfilled orders of steel had relatively short cycles of
declining amplitudes and a decidedly downward trend. Their peak in
1920 was just a little lower than the all-time high of 1917, but the
peaks of 1923, 1925, and 1929 were much lower; in fact, the highest
values of this series in the late twenties lie at about the same level as
the first postwar troughs in 1919 and 1923 (Chart 6-1). In contrast,
steel output was high most of the time during this period and had a
rising trend. The implication of a simultaneous decline in order back-
logs and rise in output is that the average delivery periods were falling
markedly. Indeed, ordering in small quantities and at short intervals,
commonly known as "hand-to-mouth buying," was a widespread
phenomenon in the 1920's, causing increased concern right up to the
onslaught of the depression.
Buying in small lots, mainly or exclusively for immediate require-
ments, had been a business practice in earlier times. But in the twenties,
many regarded it as a new and particularly worrisome problem, per-
haps because it came after a long period of rising prices, and a few
years of intensive forward buying and inventory accumulation during
the war and postwar inflation of The complaint of pro-
ducers-sellers was that the "buyers' market" was imposing on them
the higher costs of handling small orders, greater uncertainty, and more
severe limitations on business planning. Actually, many prices were
3Cf. Leverett S. Lyon, Hand-to-Mouth Buying, Washington, D.C., 1929.Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 249
weak or declining in these years, particularly after 1925, and this, as on
previous occasions, was a major cause of hand-to-mouth buying. At
the same time, the amounts spent by business on plant and equipment
were substantial and showed a moderately rising trend. Thus the
productive capacities —formanufacturing, transportation, communica-
tion—were expanding and improving. Buyers, aware that suppliers
could cover their requirements on short orders, appear to have taken
liberal advantage of this situation.
Aggregative Indexes, 1920—33 and 1935—44
For the years 1920—3 3, a monthly index of unfilled orders based on
seventeen commodities has been compiled by the Department of Com-
merce.4 The U.S. Steel Corporation series accounts for nearly 40 per
cent of the total weight in this index, which helps to explain the
similarity of the two series (compare the upper curves in Charts 6-1
and 6-2). However, the general trend and cyclical characteristics of
steel backlogs were shared broadly by other components of the Com-
merce unfilled orders index. Chart 6-2 shows the latter along with the
Federal Reserve index of manufacturing production. The divergent
trends in the two indexes during the twenties are of the same kind as
those found in the steel series, which suggests that the tendency to
place short orders was common to buyers of a wide variety of manu-
factured products. The cyclical timing comparisons again indicate a
lead of unfilled orders at output peaks and a more irregular, on the
average roughly coincident, timing at troughs.5
Not surprisingly, unfilled orders fell more rapidly than production
during the Great Depression. Between 1929 and 1938, the Commerce
index of backlogs declined from approximately 90 to 26 points, or by
71 per cent. The index of manufacturing production went down from
40 to 18 points, or by 55 per cent. This may perhaps exaggerate the
'SeeSurveyof CurrentBusiness,January 1928,pp. 22—23,for a description of this index and data
for 1920—27. The Composition of the index and the percentage weights of the groups are: textiles
(cotton finishing, hosiery, knit underwear, pyroxylin-coated textiles), 16; iron and steel (pig iron,
steel, sanitary enarnelware), 47; transportation equipment (freight cars, ships, locomotives), 10;
lumber products (flooring, furniture), 20; paper (boxboard), 2; brick and glass (common brick, face
brick, paving brick, illuminating glassware), 5.
All these series, as well as the combined index, were seasonally adjusted for the National Bureau
by the Census electronic computer method.
Backlogs led at the three successive peaks in production by 2, 9, and 3 months (on the average,
by 4.7 months). They lagged by 10 months at the 1921 trough in production, but turned up at about
the same time as production in the following three recoveries; the mean here is a short lag of un-
filled orders (of 1.8 months), the median a short lead (of 0.5 months). Cf. Chart 6-2.250 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Chart 6-2
Indexes of Unfilled Orders and Manufacturing Production, 1920—33
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles. Series are seasonally adjusted.
contrast; the production index is a much more comprehensive aggre-
gate than the unfilled orders index. However, the result makes good
sense, at least qualitatively. A dwindling of advance orders was in-
evitable since prices were falling, pessimistic expectations were
spreading, and investment goods, which are primarily produced to
order, were being hit harder than any other category by the slump in
demand.
Most of the new and unfilled order series published by trade associa-
tions were discontinued in the early 1930's, and so were the Com-
merce indexes based on a cross section of these statistics. A new in-
dex of the value of manufacturers' backlogs, compiled by the National
1920'21 '22'23'24'25 '26 '27 '28'29'30 '31 '32'33
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Industrial Conference Board, begins in 1935. These figures, intro-
duced in May 1941, refer to three aggregates: (1) durable goods
manufacturers (said to cover ten industries); (2) nondurable goods
manufacturers (seven industries); and (3) the combined index (all
seventeen industries). Chart 6-3 shows the NICB indexes for the
durable and nondurable goods sectors separately, and the correspond-
ing NICB shipments indexes.6
At the time of the 1937 downturn, industry on the whole was still
operating considerably below capacity. The peaks in unfilled orders
for both durable and nondurable goods occurred in April 1937, coin-
ciding with the peaks in the corresponding shipments series (Chart
6-3). At these peaks, backlogs were still rather small, absolutely and
relative to shipments, even though they had increased substantially
during the slow recovery of the thirties, because they had risen from
painfully low levels. In January 1935, the ratio of backlogs to ship-
ments was 0.7 for all durable goods; in April 1937, the ratio was 1.3.
This is still a low figure compared to the ratio of more than 3.0 in
March 1941, when backlogs were said to average from three to eight
times more than monthly shipments of the various durable goods in-
dustries.7
Because they were so low, unfilled orders could provide very little
support to production in 1937. Once new orders turned down, which
according to the NICB estimates occurred in December 1936 or
March 1937,8 output and shipments had to turn down very soon.
There was simply no reserve of unfinished advance commitments to
stem or even cushion the fall, and the downturns in both shipments
and order backlogs were, as the chart shows, abrupt.
After declining steeply during the recession, the two durables series
unmistakably turned up in June 1938 (the month of the general busi-
ness trough). Through the third quarter of 1939 their recovery pro-
unfilled orders indexes include the following industries: Durable goods—automobile equip-
ment,building equipment, electrical equipment, iron and steel, machinery, metal products, non-
ferrous metals, office equipment, railroad equipment, and household furnishings; nondurable goods—
boots and shoes, chemicals and drugs, clothing, leather, paper manufactures, and textiles.
The shipments indexes cover the same industries plus two durable goods industries (cement and
glass) and one nondurable goods industry (rubber goods).
See National Industrial Conference Board, ConferenceBoard Economic Record, NewYork,
May 24, 1941, pp. 223—24, for a description of the unfilled orders indexes and data for 1935—41.
For a description of the value-of-shipments indexes and the corresponding data for 1929—40, see
ibid.,December26, 1940, pp. 1—11.
7Cf. ConferenceBoard Economic Record,May 24, 1941, p. 223.
8The level in March was only slightly lower than that in December. See Chart 10-1.252 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Chart 6-3
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Unfilled orders
Shipments
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles in unfilled orders; triangles,
sales (value of shipments). Series are seasonally adjusted.
Source: National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) and U.S. Department of
Commerce, Office of Business Economics (OBE).
ceeded at similar rates. But then, with the outbreak of the war in
Europe and the beginning of the great armament program in the United
States, aggregate demand began to outstrip supply, despite fuller utili-
zation of the existing productive resources and the addition of new
ones. This is clearly apparent in the chart, which shows that during the
period of approximately forty months from mid-1939 through 1942,
shipments increased from 100 to about 350 but unfilled orders in-
creased from 100 to nearly 1,500! For nondurables, the levels and in-
creases were of course much smaller throughout, but even here the rise
in backlogs was very marked (from 100 in 1939 to a peak of over 450 in254 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
mid-1943) and was much larger than the rise in the rate of deliveries
(which just about doubled in the same period).
These movements are easy to understand qualitatively. Production,
though expanding greatly, was nevertheless lagging well behind the
rapidly rising demand, causing large extensions of the average delivery
periods. This was the time of a vast shift in the whole pattern of pro-
duction as required by the armament program of the government. The
creation of complex war industries involved unprecedented investment
in new plant and machinery and related equipment. Despite the heavy
unemployment that still existed in 1939, shortages soon developed of
skilled and semiskilled labor needed in the new industries. Bottlenecks
were also reported in some key raw materials, steel capacities, ma-
chine-tool production, and shipping.9
Comprehensive Current-Dollar Estimates, 1939—49
The aggregative Department of Commerce series on the value of
manufacturers' order backlogs for all durable goods industries and a
group of reporting nondurable goods industries begin in 1939. These
are the most comprehensive data available, and they correspond to
the Commerce estimates of the value of manufacturers' new orders,
shipments, and inventories. A breakdown of these figures by major
industries, however, is not available before 1948.
Chart 6-3 shows the Commerce series on unfilled orders and ship-
ments for 1939—49. During 1939—44, the period covered by both the
NICB indexes and the Commerce aggregates, the behavior of the
corresponding series in the two sets is very similar, especially for
durables (for nondurables there are some more significant differences
in 1942—43).
In addition to confirming broadly the findings on the relative changes
provided by the NICB indexes, the Commerce figures offer some inter-
esting level comparisons. They show that unfilled orders of all manu-
facturers underwent an enormous rise in the four years from 1939 to
1942: from $4 billion to about $74 billion. All but $2 billion or $3
billion of these backlogs were in durable goods. At the same time,
shipments increased greatly but in far less spectacular manner; sales
of durable goods, for example, rose from $1.6 billion to $5.9 billion.
See the annual reviews for 1940 and 1941 in Surveyof Current Business, February1941 and
February 1942. Also see ConferenceBoard Economic Record,May 24, 1941, pp. 225—28.Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 255
Thefirst, relatively small wave in backlogs occurred between August
1939 and March 1940 and reflected protective buying against antici-
pated wartime scarcities and rising prices. New orders fell back to the
level of shipments as soon as it became evident that the expected short-
ages were not about to materialize. Comparing these developments
with those observed during the first year of the Korean War strongly
suggests that situations of this sort will produce similar reactions (see
Charts 3-1 and 3-2 and accompanying text, above).
The next and far greater rise in backlogs, which started in the spring
of 1940, mostly represented the excess of new orders for defense
products placed by government agencies (mainly with durable goods
manufacturers) over the outputs that the producers could supply on
relatively short notice. However, orders for civilian goods also in-
creased substantially in this period as a result of rising incomes and,
probably, of renewed fears of shortages. After a slowdown in the
second half of 1941, unfilled orders for durables rose rapidly in 1942,
the first year of active war for the United States, despite impressive
increases in production and shipments. The bulk of these orders called
for the delivery of war goods by companies converting to war produc-
tion; the backlogs of nondurables stayed high but increased just a
little and erratically. In 1943, unified orders leveled off and started
declining. The flows of critical materials for war production were by
then generally controlled by priorities and allocations, which most
likely made "forward buying" more difficult and less needed. Industry
was now geared to war needs, and new orders conformed well on the
whole to actual requirements, as did the production schedules.
To the extent that the price ceilings imposed upon most categories
of goods and services in April 1942 were effective, prices were pre-
vented from rising in counteraction to excess demands. This in itself
would tend to contribute to backlog accumulation of purchase orders.'°
But a large part of the output of durable goods manufacturers was
actually excluded from the general price-ceiling legislation. The ex-
emption applied to "distinctively military" goods and to products
made largely to order at prices determined in individual contracts."
10Onthe relation between price changes and backlog changes, see Chapter 7.
"Harvey C. Mansfield and Associates, A ShortHistory ofOPA, Office of Price Administration,
Washington, D.C., 1 947, pp. 46—47. Soon after the General Maximum Price Regulation (GMPR)
was issued, another regulation (MPR 136) provided a pricing formula for machinery of all sorts. This
held a manufacturer to his own price-determining method as of the base period (spring 1942) but did256 Causesand Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
New orders for durable goods ceased expanding in March and un-
filled orders in November 1942; but shipments maintained their rate
of growth through the summer of 1943, then oscillated around a high
and slightly rising level for about 18 months, and did not turn down
decisively until after March 1945 (see the OBE series in Chart 6-3).
Presumably, the huge accumulation of backlogs in the early phase of
the war helped to keep up production and shipments for a considerable
time in the subsequent phase. However, one must add that the down-
ward drift of the backlogs was, according to the Commerce estimates,
very mild initially; so no significant decline resulted before 1944. In
contrast to the abrupt downturn in 1937 (when backlogs were still
low), the big wartime wave in durable unfilled orders was gently
rounded off at its peak late in 1942.12
At the end of the war, order backlogs dropped sharply under the im-
pact of cancellations of military contracts, but they rose again in 1946.
Shipments turned upward only four months after backlogs, in February
1946.
The expansion in backlogs of durable goods that began late in 1945
lasted only one year, and at its end the aggregate value of the accumu-
lated orders was much smaller than it had been during the war. How-
ever, the increase in the rate of output was in this phase limited by the
difficulties of conversion from wartime to peacetime production, and
backlogs were, in effect, still very large relative to shipments (see
Chart 6-3). Hence, shipments could again continue to rise gradually
for a long time after backlogs ceased growing. The lags of shipments on
this occasion were as long as 23 to 26 months for total manufacturing
and all durables.13
In nondurables, which account for a minor proportion (about 5to7
per cent) of total order backlogs of manufacturers, the wartime expan-
noteffectively control the labor time and quantities of materials entering into his computation. The
decision not to attempt to establish ceilings for military goods was taken tentatively when the GMPR
was issued, then confirmed officially in the autumn of 1942. However, large volumes of raw and
semifabricated materials used in the production of such goods were left under the general price con-
trol of the OPA.
12 A late version of the NICB figures shows a more pronounced decline of durable backlogs in
1943 (see Chart 6-3), but this series, which was shortly afterward discontinued, is believed to give
less reliable evidence here than the Commerce series.
13 However, among the major component industries, electrical and nonelectrical machinery are the
only groups to which lags of this magnitude can be traced (see below, Table 6-I, column I). Also note
the mildness of the 1947—48 decline in durable backlogs and a secondary peak in this series in August
1948 (Chart 6-3).Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 257
sion was, of course, much smaller in percentage terms than it was in
durables. In contrast, the first postwar wave (1945—49) was relatively
larger in nondurable backlogs, reflecting the shifts in demand and the
difficulties of reconverting the industries in the period of transition to a
peacetime economy.
Major-Industry Series Since 1948
Charts 6-4 and 6-5 present the major-industry series on unfilled or-
ders and their ratios to the value of shipments.'4 The prevalence of
horizontal or downward trends is a common characteristic of these
series in the decade 1952—62 which followed the great backlog accu-
mulations of the Korean War period. Later in the 1960's, however,
rising tendencies are again strongly in evidence for unfilled orders of
most component industries and the over-all aggregates.
Another feature of these series is the dominance of large cyclical
movements during most of the postwar period and the drastic reduc-
tion in their amplitudes in the late fifties and the sixties. Unfilled or-
ders of durable goods manufacturers increased vastly in the first phase
of the Korean War, 1950—52, then declined much less in the second
phase and during the recession of 1953—54. Between 1954 and 1962,
three increases in total and durables backlogs occurred which were
progressively smaller and shorter; of the three corresponding decreases,
each was about equal to the preceding rise in size and duration. As this
implies, the successive peak levels of backlogs declined, while the suc-
cessive trough levels differed little. In other words, the fluctuations in
unfilled orders had a downward drift and became at the same time shal-
lower in amplitude.
The aggregates resumed a rather steady upward movement at the
end of 1962 (Chart 6-4). After four years, this long climb brought them
back to the top levels of 1952, and by mid-1969 most of these series
had risen to new all-time heights.15 This, however, refers to current-
dollar values; in constant dollars, the backlogs of the mid-1960's
would be smaller than those of the early 1950's. Furthermore, the re-
14Dataon unfilled orders in the post-World War 11 periodcorrespond to thedata on shipments,
inventories, and new orders and come from the same source: The monthly Industry Survey of the
OBE before the 1963 revision, and the current Census Bureau compilation thereafter. The OBE in-
dustry series begin in 1948; the Census series in 1953. The published data relate to the two-digit
industries and (after the revision) to broad market categories.
Unfilledorders for durable goods reached a level of $76 billion in October 1966, just a little
above their standing in November 1962. In May 1969, their new peak level was nearly $87 billion.258 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Chart 6-4
Value of Unfilled Orders and Ratios of Unfilled Orders to
Shipments, Total Manufacturing, Total Durable Goods
Industries, and Nondurable Goods Industries
Reporting Unfilled Orders, 1947—65
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles; circles, short cycles or retarda-
tions. Series are seasonally adjusted.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics and Bureau of
the Census.Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 259
Chart 6-5
Valueof Unfilled Orders and Ratios of Unfilled Orders to
Shipments, Seven Major Durable Goods Industries,
Quarterly, 1953—65





Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded
areas, expansions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles;
circles, short cycles or retardations. Series are seasonally adjusted.
Source: Bureau of the Census.
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Chart 6-5(concluded)
Billiondollars 4. Electrical Machinery
7. Other Durable Goods IndustriesUnfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 261
cent over-all ratios of unfilled orders to sales are much smaller than
they were during the earlier postwar booms.
While this seems to describe the over-all picture fairly, there were
differences among the major component industries. Thus the ma-
chinery industries show relatively mild fluctuations and more rising
trends in their order backlogs; the primary metals series show huge
fluctuations and declining trends (Chart 6-5).
Total Backlogs and Backlog-Shipment Ratios
Over long stretches of time, industrial capacities are kept large
enough by past and continuing capital formation to accommodate de-
mand at moderate growth rates. Thus, output and shipments had up-
ward trends in 192 1—29, but unfilled orders show little of any trend (or
some slight downward drift) in the same period (Chart 6-2). This im-
plies that the backlog-shipment (U IS) ratios, an indicator of relative
demand pressures, declined in the 1920's. A similar situation prevailed
during much of the decade following the Korean War (Charts 6-4 and
6-5).
Cyclically, unfilled orders and shipments move in the same direction
much of the time, but the fluctuations of unfilled orders are much larger.16
Hence, the cyclical course of the backlog-shipment ratios is influenced
more strongly by the major movements of U than of S. and in fact tends
to reflect closely the course of U for each industry. By the same token,
however, the cyclical movements of the ratios tend to be smaller in
relative amplitude than the corresponding movements of the backlog
series. On the other hand, the U/S ratios are subject to much more fre-
quent and larger irregular month-to-month variations than are the U
series, which are remarkably smooth. This reflects not only the much
greater smoothness of the backlog values, which are "stock" variables,
compared to the shipments values, which represent "flows," but also
any cumulation of the errors of observation of U and S in the ratios that
combine both.
Strike effects deserve to be specially noted as one type of the major
sporadic disturbances that are conspicuous in some U/S ratio series.
The industry principally affected is, of course, primary metals. Since its
shipments fall drastically during major steel strikes and its backlogs
are not much affected, its U/S ratios show needlelike rises and falls
'°Charts 3-1and 3-2show value-of-shipments aggregates comparable to the unfilled orders series
inCharts 6-4 and 6-5.262 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
during the strikes in 1949, 1952, 1956, and 1959 (Chart 6-5). More-
over, intensified buying in anticipation of a strike can cause a temporary
valley in the ratio series immediately preceding the rise in the strike
months (such developments are strongly in evidence in 1949 and 1959).
The strike effects cause a certain amount of difficulty in dating some of
the turning points in the series.'7
The backlog-shipment ratio often lags behind troughs in total back-
logs but not peaks (Charts 6-4 and 6-5). As already noted, the peaks of
large backlog expansions led the downturns of shipments by long in-
tervals. The ratio should begin to decline at least as soon as U does, if
S is still rising; indeed, it should turn down earlier if the expansion of U
in its terminal phase is slowed down to rates lower than those at which
S is expanding. Actually, our charts show that leads of UIS relative to
U at peaks are not uncommon, although they tend to be short.
At troughs, in contrast, the timing of unfilled orders and shipments is
in most cases roughly coincident. When the two start rising together,
the percentage increase of U will often initially be less than that of S,
which implies that the upturn of the U/S ratio will lag. For the ratio to
turn upward at once, in fact, new orders should increase rapidly in the
early expansion phase, overshooting shipments by large amounts and
thereby giving rise to sufficiently large positive Apparently, this
does not occur frequently. Moreover, backlogs have often lagged
shipments at troughs since 1954, though usually not by long intervals
(see below, Table 6-1). Where this happens, the upturn in U is likely to
come at a time when the rise in S is already well on its way, which
would accentuate the lag of the U/S ratio.
Market-Category Series Since 1953
The new series on unfilled orders classified by market categories,
and their ratios to shipments, are presented in Chart 6-6. These data
'7The strike peak in 1949 came shortly after the trough in the U/S series for primary metals and
can thus be ignored. (That trough was presumably accented, but was certainly not caused, by pre-
strike buying; compare, for example, the behavior of U and U/S during this episode in Chart 6-5.) In
contrast, the strike peak in 1952 came at the time when the ratio series reached its highest levels; it
therefore can be regarded as approximately coincident with the "true" specific-cycle peak in this
series. The situation was similar in 1956, though here there was still a slight rise in the ratio in the
first quarter of 1957. Finally, in 1959 the deep prestrike valley must be disregarded in dating the
troughs; but the long strike brought such a pronounced increase in the ratio that the existence of a
peak here is not seriously in doubt (cf. also the movement of total backlogs in this period).
It may be added that measures of peak and trough levels and cyclical amplitudes are very strongly
affected in these cases, even where the timing measures are not. In an analysis of the peak and
trough values of the UIS ratios later in this chapter, we shall in effect smooth out the extreme effects
of the strikes (see Table 6-4).Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 263
correspond to the series on new orders and shipments analyzed in
Chapters 3 and 4•18
Therecorded course of these aggregates begins from top levels at-
tained early in 1953 and describes steep declines in 195 3—54, followed
by large expansions in 1955—56 and contractions in 1957—58. After
that, the series generally drift downward through 1962, with only very
small cyclical variations. Finally, there are the long upward move-
ments after 1963, initially somewhat hesitant but later proceeding at
very impressive and sustained rates. Late in 1966 most of these series
had already regained their peak levels of 1953.
This is the "typical profile" against which one might consider the
differences among the market categories. Thus, the movements of
1955—58 add up to large and almost symmetrical trough-to-trough
waves in equipment industries and in the larger part of the category of
materials, supplies, and intermediate products. For construction mate-
rials, the expansion phase of this cycle was longer but less pronounced,
and the contraction phase was more accentuated. The rise in order
backlogs for defense products came late (in the last quarter of 1955)
and was relatively short (about one year). The ensuing decline in this
series lasted, with minor interruptions, through 1962.
The diminution of cyclical movements after the 1957—58 recession
was most drastic for the equipment-producing group of industries and
for construction materials, and least for home goods and apparel and
consumer staples. The expansions of the 1960's have been very large
in unfilled orders for equipment, defense products, and materials. The
rise in consumer goods backlogs has been much more modest (Chart
6-6).
In the consumer goods category, it is interesting to observe that its
total unfilled orders show a succession of clearly outlined specific
cycles, even though the corresponding series on new orders and ship-
ments differ by very small amounts (see Chart 3-3). This cyclical pat-
tern is probably largely due to the consumer durables component of
this market category. Unfilled orders for consumer durables, available
See in particular Chart 3-3 and Table 4-9 and the accompanying text. For two categories, con-
sumer staples and automotive equipment, no separate figures on unfilled orders are published,
the series on new orders and shipments are available. As shown in Chart 3-3, new orders and ship-
ments run very close to each other for consumer staples and, after 1955, for automotive equipment.
This implies that at least the reported changesinunfilled orders are small for these products. The
levelsofthese backlogs are probably low, too, and the random elements in the changes are likely to
be relatively large.264 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Chart 6-6
Value of Unfilled Orders and Ratios of Unfilled Orders to
Shipments, Seven Market Categories,
Monthly, 1953—66




2. Consumer DurablesChart 6-6 (concluded)
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Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles; circles, minor turns and retarda-
tions.
Source: Bureau of the Census.
4. Defense Products
5. Machinery and Equipment
6. Construction Materials, Supplies, and Intermediate Products
7. Other Materials, Supplies, and Intermediate Products
3
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since 1960, show broad movements parallel to those of unified orders
for the total category of home goods, etc., and the timing of the two
series in the early 1960's is virtually identical:19
Unfilled orders for the different market categories vary greatly in
size. Their end-of-month stock values, in billions of current dollars,
range as follows in the period 1953—69:
Home goods, etc. 1.6—4.2 Machinery and equipment
industries 7.8—25.1
Equipment and defense23.8—48.9 Construction materials,
etc. 4.2—10.9
Defense products 17.4—34.0 Other materials, etc. 14.7—29.0
Thus equipment and defense products accounted for the largest part
of the backlog of orders and consumer goods for the smallest, with
materials ranking in between. Defense orders represented a larger
proportion of the aggregate backlog of commitments to supply ma-
chinery and nonautomotive equipment than did the orders on other
predominantly private accounts.2°
The general characteristics of the U/S series for the market cate-
gories compiled through 1966 are much like those of the correspond-
ing data for the major industries. The ratios show downward trends in
the decade 1953—62, interrupted by rises in 1955—56 and 1958—59,
and upward movements in the last three or four years that are covered.
The longer trends and the short irregular variations are more pro-
nounced and the cyclical fluctuations are less pronounced, in the U/S
ratios than in backlogs proper. By the end of 1966, unfilled orders for
the equipment and defense and materials categories had regained or
slightly exceeded their highest 1953 levels, but the backlog-shipment
ratios were still considerably lower in 1966 than in 1953. Where turn-
ing points in the ratios series can be identified and matched with the
IDConsumerdurables include householdfurniture,fixtures, and appliances, and various other items
such as kitchen articles, hand tools, watches, and personal goods. Home goods, etc., includes knitting
and floor covering, apparel, and leather products, additional consumer staples such as food and
beverages, tobacco, paper and printed products, drugs, etc. See section on "Market Categories" in
Chapter 3 for more detail. In 1960—63, consumer durables accounted on the average for approxi-
mately two-thirds of total unfilled orders of the category of home goods, apparel, and consumer
staples.
Thisis in part due to the much longer average delivery periods for the defense products, as indi-
cated by the high U!Sratios for this category (see text below). Within total shipmentsofmachinery
and equipment except automotive, the shares of defense products and of all other items tend to be
more nearly equal.Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 267
turning points in the corresponding backlog series, rough coincidences
or short leads of the ratios are often found at peaks, and lags at troughs.
The U/S ratios for the different market categories also vary greatly
in their average size and in the amplitudes of their movements. Thus
the ratios for home goods, etc., range from 0.15 to 0.56; and those for
defense products, from 8.0 to 17.3. Between these extremes are the
figures for machinery and equipment (3.1 to 7.2), construction mate-
rials (1.6 to 3.1), and other materials (1.2 to 2.9).
Measures of Relative Timing
Major-Industry Series
Turning points in unfilled orders and shipments can be compared in
each of the zones associated with postwar recessions and revivals in
business activity, with a few exceptions in the nonautomotive trans-
portation equipment and the nondurable goods industries (Table 6-1).
No "extra" movements and additional timing observations are re-
corded here for the Korean War period, unlike the comparisons with
new orders in Chapter 4,21Onthe other hand, unfilled orders did un-
dergo minor declines in connection with the business retardation in
1962, which give rise to extra comparisons with shipments in this
period (columns 9 and 10).
The leads of unfilled orders at peaks in shipments of durable goods
show a definite and strong tendency to get shorter, as can be seen by
comparing the odd-numbered columns 1,...,9in the table. From
the measures for the six component industries, the average leads or
lags for the five successive peak zones are —9.2, —7.3, —3.5, +1.8, and
—1.0 months. However, there are indications of longer leads of U
relative to S at the most recent (1969) peaks in these aggregates (—5
for total durables). It will be recalled that the downward trend of Un-
21The contractions in unfilled orders of durable goods start generally in 1952 and continue through
the 1953—54 recession; their beginning dates match the peaks in shipments that can be associated
with the 1953 business downturn. The declines in 1951 did not carry new orders below the levels of
shipments; hence backlogs continued to increase and had no "extra" movements and turns in this
period.
Backlogs of nondurables turned down early in 1951, and so did shipments. These turns cannot be
associated directly with the 1953 recession, and the recording of their comparison in column 3 of
Table 6-i is merely a matter of convenience. However, here too, backlogs show no substantial extra
movements; their decline lasted well into the 1953—54 recession (while shipments increased in 1952
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Notes to Table 6-I
Note: All measures for all manufacturing, total durables, and nondurables and meas-
ures for the component industries in columns 6—12, are based on the new Census data
(1963 revision). The other measures are based on the earlier OBE data (the revised
series for th.e component industries begin in 1953).
n.a. =datanot available.
n.i. =notidentified (timing uncertain).
n.u. =noturn in unfilled orders.
n.s. =noturn in shipments.
n.t. =noturning points.
aThesepairs of peaks or troughs represent "extra" turns, not related to a cyclical
recession or revival recognized in the National Bureau chronology. All of the compar-
isons in column 9 and some of those in column 10 refer to dates marking the beginning
and end of minor movements or retardations rather than to specific-cycle turns.
bAveragesof entries in columns I and 3.
Averages of entries in columns 5, 7, and 9.
dBasedon peaks in shipments that occurred in May—June 1959, before the major
steel strike in the second half of the year (Charts 3-1 and 3-2).
eBasedon poststrike peaks in shipments (Chart 3-2).
The pre1 953 measures are based in part on unpublished data received from the De-
partment of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.
gBasedon secondary troughs in unfilled orders and shipments.
hUnfilledorders are compared with shipments excluding motor vehicles and parts.
'Includes professional and scientific instruments; lumber; furniture; stone, clay, and
glass; and miscellaneous industries.
Includes textiles, leather, paper, and printing and publishing.
kRelatesto turning points in March and May of 1951. See note 21 in this chapter.
filled orders in 1952—6 1 was followed by an upward movement of
somewhat larger over-all amplitude in 1962—69.
The comparison for nondurables does not show any regular tendency
of this sort, but here, too, leads of U relative to S are dominant at peaks
and occasionally are long (as before the 1948 and the 1957 recessions).
Short leads and lags prevail throughout at troughs, as shown by a
comparison of the even-numbered columns 2,..., 10.The averages
for the six component durable goods industries at the successive
trough zones are —0.7,+1.0,0, +1.4, and +0.6 months. The averages
by industry are also of the same type, mostly short lags of shipments
(column 14).
A plausible interpretation of these findings is that they indicate an
important link between the size of order backlogs during the expansion
and the timing of the downturns of shipments. The evidence supports270 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
the hypothesis that the rise of shipments is prolonged (the downturns
lag more) when backlogs are large. However, the output-supporting
potential of unfilled orders may vary with changes in productive ca-
pacities, relative strength of current demand, and expectations.22
The roughly coincident timing of unfilled orders at troughs in ship-
ments contrasts with the lead at peaks, especially the long lead in the
first part of the period. Since the upturn in unfilled orders, as we date
it, would sometimes come at the end of a "bottoming-up" phase, short
lags are not inconsistent here with some active role for the backlog fac-
tor. Even a stabilization of unfilled orders following a period of decline
may help end the contraction in production and deliveries; and an up-
turn in unifiled orders, signalizing an influx of new business above the
current rates of manufacturing operations, is likely to have a definite
stimulating effect.
It is clear that the leads and lags in Table 6-1 vary greatly over time
for most industries, and cannot therefore be adequately described by
the means in columns 1 l_14.23 The purpose of the means is merely to
highlight the broad tendencies just discussed.
Average Measures for Subdivisions of the Durables Sector
Measures of the relative timing of unfilled orders and shipments are
summarized in Table 6-2 for the detailed industry categories of the
pre-1963 OBE compilation. (The underlying data correspond to those
used in Appendix E.)
The recorded observations are grouped into (1) those relating to the
early postwar peaks, 1948—53; (2) those relating to the more recent
peaks, 1957—60; and (3) those at all covered troughs, 1949—6 1. There
were two peak zones in the earlier and two in the later period, and four
trough zones. For some industries, however, fewer observations are
available, particularly for the early postwar peaks.
In those durable goods industries where manufacture to order is
22Note,e.g., that the lags of S at the 1952 peaks of U, although still long, were on the whole signifi-
cantly shorter than the lags in the 1940's. The U/S ratios were higher in 1952—53 than in 1947—48,
but their reduction required more time in the earlier than in the later period. (The ratio for the durable
goods industries declined from 5 to 3 in approximately two years during the late forties; it declined
from 7 to 5—in terms of generally higher monthly sales rates —inabout seventeen months during the
mid-fifties.) This may reflect the growth of industrial capacity and efficiency of production; later,
when the demand pressures generally subsided, the same forces manifested themselves more directly
in the downward trends of the U/S ratios.
23 averagedeviations from these means vary from 2 to 12 months for the 1948—53 peaks, from
1.8 to 7.6 months for the 1957—62 peaks, and from 0.4 to 2.3 months for the troughs.Table 6-2
Average Timing of Unfilled Orders at Turns in Shipments, by























Industry (1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary metals
Iron and steel —6.0 —3.0 —4.5 —0.2
Primary nonferrous metals —10.5 +0.5 —5.0 +3.5
Other primary metals —5.5 +1.5 —2.0 0
Fabricated metal products
Heating and n.a. +6.0 +6.0 0
Structural metal worke n.a. —3.5 —3.5 +2.5
Tin cans and othere n.a. —5.5 —5.5 +0.5
Electrical machinery
Electrical generator apparatus —9 +lOd +0.5 +10.3
Radio, TV, and equipment +1 +5 d +3.0 +2.7
Other electrical equipment —4 —0.3 —3.2
Machinery exc. electrical
Metalworking machinery +10 _4d —7.0 +0.7
General industrial machinery —18 —4.5 —9.0 +1.5
Special machinery +1 _13d —6.0 —2.3
Engines and turbines —15 —6.5 —9.3 +1.5
Construction machinery +1 —7.0 —4.3 +3.5
Office and store machines 0 —11 e —5.5 +3.0
Agricultural implements +1.5 +0.5 +1.0 +8.7
Household and service appliances +0.5 +4.0 +2.2 +4.8
Other machinery and parts —15 +1.0 —4.3 +1.2
Transportation equipment
Motor vehicles —7 —1.5 —3.3 +0.5
Motor vehicle parts and accessories —4.5 0 —2.2 +0.5
Aircraft —4 —13 d ...55 —7
Other nonautomotive equipment —5 —6.5 —6.0 —2.2
Other durable goods
Lumber +1 —2.0 —1.0 —0.3
Furniture +5 +1.5 +2.7 +0.7
Stone, clay, and glass products —1.0 —1.0 —1.0 +4.5
Professional and scientific instru-
ments —1 —3.0 —2.3 +0.7
Miscellaneous mc). ordnance —2.0 n.a. —2.0 +5.0
Nondurable goods industries
Textile-mill products —2.3 —2.0 —2.2 +0.6
Leather and leather products —2.0 —19.5 —9.0 —2.0
Paper and allied products —8.0 —6.0 +2.2272 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Notes to Table 6-2
n.a.= not available.
a Numbers with decimals represent averages. Negative or positive integers refer to
cases in which only one observation was available for the given period and type of turn.
(IncolumnI, such figures refer to the 1953 peak zone, i.e., no observations were availa-
ble in these cases for the 1948 peak zone.)
b Column 1 covers the turning zones associated with the recessions of 1948 and 1953;
column2, those associated with the recessions of 1957 and 1960.
c The series begin in 1955, and their first turning points are peaks associated with the
1957 recession.
d Single observation; no comparison could be made in the 1960 peak zone.
esingle observation; no comparison could be made in the 1957 peak zone.
stronglyrepresented, the tendency for the average leads of U relative
to S to be longer at the earlier than at the later postwar downturns
shows up clearly in Table 6-2. Of the nineteen industries in this sector
for which comparisons can be made (all those in primary metals, elec-
trical machinery, machinery other than electrical, and transportation
equipment), eleven show reductions in the backlog leads and five show
increases (columns 1 and 2).24 On the other hand, the results for the
group of "other durable goods" show roughly coincident timing of U
and S at both the early and the late postwar peaks. There are also no
apparent systematic differences between the two subperiods in the
observations for the nondurable goods industries.
At troughs, rough coincidences are predominant throughout, with a
tendency toward short lags of U and S. This finding, too, is consistent
with the results based on the previously introduced data for the major
industries.
Market Categories
One-to-one correspondence exists between the cyclical movements
of U and S for each of the three groups, machinery and equipment,
construction materials, and other materials, despite their divergent
trends in the decade starting in 1953 (Charts 3-3 and 6-6). The series
for defense products show similar agreement, except in 1959—62 when
unfilled orders for defense kept declining almost without interruption
while shipments underwent sizable fluctuations. The series for con-
sumer goods also have matching turns except in the early 1960's.
Of the thirteen timing comparisons at peaks identified in Table 6-3,









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8276 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Notes to Table 6-4
aDataare in current dollars except for the following: steel sheets, paperboard—tons;
freight cars, oil burners—numbers; oak flooring—board feet.
bThedates identify the years of the first and the last turn in shipments or production
at which the timing of the series can be determined.
cIncludessome minor but well-established turns (see notes f—i). Comparisons based
on these turns are included in the figures in columns 4—10. All numbers refer to the pe-
riods listed in column 1.
dForeach item, the entry on the first line is for comparisons at peaks; the entry on the
second line, for comparisons at troughs.
eIncludesexact coincidences and leads or lags of one, two, or three months.
Includes one turn that may be regarded as a minor rather than a specific-cycle turn.
gIncludestwo minor turns.
hIncludessix minor turns.
'Includes four minor turns.
seven are leads and three are lags of U relative to S; of the nineteen
comparisons at troughs, five are leads and thirteen are lags. Most of the
leads are relatively long (4 months or more), while most of the lags are
short (1 or 2 months). Rough coincidences (observations in the range
of ±3 months) account for less than half of the comparisons at peaks
and for about two-thirds of those at troughs.
Backlogs appear to lead shipments for defense products and to lag
shipments for consumer goods, but these results rest on an extremely
slender basis and might at best have some suggestive value. For the
total equipment category and its nondefense component, the evidence
is stronger that U led S at peaks and that the two variables were ap-
proximately coincident at troughs. Lags and coincidences prevail
among the observations for the two materials categories, and the timing
averages here are short lags at both peaks and troughs (see Table 6-3,
columns 8 and 9).
Individual Industries or Products
Table 6-4 summarizes the timing comparisons between unfilled or-
ders and shipments or output for ten different products or groups of
products. Those items are from the sample used in Chapters 3 and 4 for
the analysis of the relationships with new orders. Most of the series go
back to the 1920's; in several cases, they extend to the post-World War
II years.
The products include some items of equipment which definitely
represent manufacture to order and have substantial average deliveryUnfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 277
periods, some materials made mainly to order but with short delivery
periods, and some staples made typically to stock. Railroad freight
cars and machine tools exemplify the first, steel sheets the second, and
oak flooring the third category. However, the sample gives a rather
weak representation to goods made to order and having long delivery
lags. This may help to explain the preponderance among these obser-
vations of rough coincidences, including many short lags of backlogs,
particularly at troughs. For goods made to stock or on very short
notice, new orders and shipments usually run closely together and
whether N exceeds S or vice versa is often governed by random in-
fluences. Where this is true, unfilled orders should show relatively little
systematic movement over stretches of time but many small and short
irregular variations. These variations in the backlog series should cease
and the series should begin expanding only after cyclical or other
forces that can cause long systematic runs of positive N-S differences
have become dominant. While this argument, mutatis mutandis, also
applies in principle to runs of negative differences and the beginning
of backlog contraction, the two situations are actually not symmetrical,
or at least need not be. This is because of delivery delays and backlog
accumulations during a business boom; these may occur in any in-
dustry and when they do, output and shipments can "feed" on unfilled
orders and are likely to lag behind the latter on the downgrade.
A related fact to which the observed timing patterns can be attributed
is that unfilled orders were generally small in the interwar years except
in the immediate aftermath of World War I; in the depressed thirties,
of course, their levels were extremely low. While many time series may
be used to illustrate the great economic upheaval that marked the
transition to the wartime economy of the 1940's, there can be only a
few that showed the contrast as sharply as did the order backlogs,
especially for durable goods. From the comparisons underlying Table
6-4, it appears that the timing relations between unfilled orders and
shipments changed markedly with the advent of the war. (For example,
in the period before 1941, the mean lags of S behind U for railroad
freight cars, in months, were 3.8 at peaks and 1.2 at all turns; in the
period after 1941, the corresponding figures were 9.0 and 5.5. For
electric overhead cranes, the over-all lags were 0.8 months before 1941
and 6 months after.278 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Backlog-Shipment Ratios
Peak and Trough Values
Table 6-5 lists the successive high and low standings of the U/S
ratios for the major manufacturing industries and the averages of these
values classified by industry and type of turn. The ratios are based on
the Census data shown in Charts 6-4 and 6-5, and on the old OBE data
for component industries and some of their groupings, which permit
coverage of the earlier postwar years, 1948_53.25
The backlog-shipment ratios are throughout much higher for the
durable goods than for the nondurable goods industries. Even the
lowest of the individual ratio series for the durables exceed on most oc-
casions the highest of the ratio series for the nondurables.2°
In the durable goods sector, transportation equipment has the high-
est mean ratios; electrical machinery is second; nonelectrical ma-
chinery, third; fabricated metals, fourth; and primary metals, fifth.
Other durable goods shows the lowest ratios. The ranking is the same
for the peak, trough, and "all turns" measures. Among the nondurables,
the ranking is also the same at either turn: textiles, leather, printing,
and paper, proceeding from the highest to the lowest ratio (Table 6-5,
columns 12—14).
The ranks of the industries according to the U/S ratios in the dif-
ferent peak and trough zones are highly correlated. This is shown by
the "coefficient of concordance," W, which measures the degree of
agreement among any number of rankings on a scale ranging from zero
(complete randomness) to one (perfect consistency, i.e., preservation
of the same ranks).27 For a subset of observations relating to durable
25 An analysis of the U/Sratiosbased on the ORE data for I 948—.6 I was completed before the
new series became available in 1963. It shows good agreement with the results which incorporate
the revised data.
26Compare other durable goods with textile-mill products in Table 6-5.
27Let inbethe number of rankings and n,thatof the items to be ranked. The total of ranks in each
of the marraysis n(n + 1)12 and the grand total is mn(n+1)12. (In the present case, it is the industry
components of a sector that are ranked and there is a ranking for each period; that is, inrefersto the
columns and ntothe lines of Table 6-5.) If the ranks were randomly allocated, one would expect
their sum for each item to be the same, namely 1/nth of the grand total or,n(n + 1)/2. On the other
hand, if the rankings were in perfect agreement, the sums of the ranks for the different items would
bern, 2m, 3m,..., nm (in some order not identifiable in advance). The sum of squares of the devi-
ations of these rank totals from m(n + J)/2 is Smax =m2(n3—n)/12;and the ratio of the sum of
squares of the actual deviations (S) to SmaxiS
W= SiSmax = 125/ in2 (n3 — n).
Fora complete statement of the theory underlying the measurement of concordance, see Maurice
0. Kendall, RankCorrelation Methods, London,1948, Chap. 6.Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 279
goods industries, W =.702.A few columns are not included in this
measure because of gaps caused by the "no turns" entries in the table,
but the correlations among the ranks in these columns are even higher.28
For the subset of the four nondurable goods industries, W =.916.
These values (calculated with adjustments for tied ranks) are highly
significant according to the usual statistical tests.29
In short, I find that relatively high backlog-shipment ratios are con-
sistently characteristic of some industries, while low ratios are typical
of others, although all these series are subject to trends and fluctuations
which are often pronounced. This parallels the results presented early
in this book for the stock-backlog ratios (Chapter 2).
Compared with orders and shipments, the U/S series show much
less variability over time. Most of the variability is contributed by the
peak values whose average deviations from the mean range from 0.1 to
2.1; the range of the corresponding dispersion measures for the trough
values is from zero to 0.9.30 The largest deviations are associated with
the largest mean ratios, notably those in blast furnaces, electrical ma-
chinery, and transportation equipment.
The figures for the three peak periods in the 1950's reflect the gen-
eral decline of the backlog-shipment ratios in that decade. For most in-
dustries, the U/S values were lower in 1958—60 than in 1955—56 and
lower in 1955—56 than in 195 1—52 (cf. columns 3, 5, and 7).
Backlog-Shipment Ratios and the Delivery Lags
As ratios of a stock (measured in dollars) to a flow (in dollars per unit
period), the variable U/S has a time dimension. For example, if ship-
28 computation of Wrequires that the rankings be completeineach case.The reported value
of W refers to the six major durable goods industries listed, and to the periods covered in columns
1—4, 7, 10, and 11. The ranks in columns 5 and 6 (with no entries for nonelectrical machinery) are
similar, and they show a correlation of 0.9; the ranks in columns 8 and 9 ace identical, and they, too,
correspond closely to the others, except that here no measures are recorded for either of the machi-
nery industries.
The concordance coefficients provide a convenient formula for deriving the average of all rank
correlation coefficients (Spearman's) that can be computed for the in rankings. Such average cor-
relation equals R = (rnW—l)/(m — 1).
29The calculated F values are 13.98 for the durables and 56.61 for the nondurables. The test is
applied to W after a continuity correction (in which S is decreased by I and Smax increased by 2). The
value of F is computed as F = (m — 1)W/(l — W), and tables of F are consulted, using the degrees
of freedom n1=(n—I — 2)/rn and n2=(m—1)[ n—1 — 2)/rn].TheI per cent significance points
thusfound are of the order of 5.0 and 10.0, respectively; the observed F exceeds even the
F,999points.
For more detail on this test, see Helen M. Walker and Joseph Lev, StatisticalInference,New
York, 1953, pp. 283—86.
Standard deviations exceed the average deviations by very small, often very trivial, fractions
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aEachof the successive peak and trough zones is identified by the annual dates of the
earliest and latest turns in the U/S ratios.
bThehighest ratios in 1947—48 (data for 1947 are available only for the three most
comprehensive series). These are not necessarily the specific-cycle peak values of these
ratios. (Since unfilled orders of the durable goods sector declined through 1947 while
shipments rose—see Chart 6-3—the ratios for 1948 must be lower than the earlier peak
ratios for a number of industries.) Earlier data required to establish the peak ratios for
several industries are not available.
These observations refer to minor turns in the U/S ratios. Similar observations in
other periods are identified in note m.
dThehighest ratios reached by the time this analysis was completed (the latest avail-
able figure refers to November 1966). For the industries in which the U/S ratios con-
tinued to grow, these values underestimate the true peak ratios.
Industries reporting unfilled orders include the durable goods industries and the four
major nondurable goods industries listed on the last four lines.
Average of four monthly values, June—September 1952; used to reduce the reliance
on individual ratios, which were strongly affected by a steel strike (Chart 6-4). Averages
elsewhere in this table (see notes g—j and I below) were used for the same reason.
Average of three monthly values, July—September 1949.
hAverageof three monthly values, April, May, and September 1952.
'Average of four monthly values, June—September 1952.
Averages of six monthly values, July—December 1959.
kHighestvalue in 1953, the first year covered by this series; probably somewhat
lower than the peak ratios in 1952 (judging from the total primary metals data; see
Chart 6-5).
'Average of six monthly values, June—November 1956.
mReferto minor turns in the U/S ratios.
Based in part on unpublished data received from the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Office of Business Economics.
°Includesprofessional and scientific instruments; lumber; furniture; stone, clay, and
glass; and miscellaneous industries.
Includes textiles, leather, paper, and printing and publishing.
Based on unpublished OBE data for 1948—6 1.
ments per month are $10 billion and unfilled orders equal $30 billion,
the ratio U/S =3means that the backlog equals three months' worth of
current shipments. Alternatively, the ratio indicates that the backlog
could be eliminated in three months at the current rate of operation —
providedthat no new orders were received. Under the more realistic
assumption that new orders continue to add to the backlog, even while
shipments continue to reduce it, the current value of U/S does not tell282 Causes and implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
how U is going to change or at what rate. These developments depend
on the future time paths of N and S.
In this connection, it is instructive to consider a recent suggestion
that such ratio measures can be improved by using the rates of ship-
ments in later periods instead of the current rate.3' The procedure rests
on the assumptions that customers are served on a first-in first-out
basis (orders keep their chronological places in the queue) and that
new orders and deliveries are evenly distributed over the periods of
observation. Given the backlogat the end of month t, one then asks
how many months of the subsequently observed shipments would have
been needed to liquidate that backlog. That is, one cumulatively adds
.., and determines the value of k for which =
Like the ordinary ratio k can be interpreted as a "number of
months." In each case, a stock variable, is related to flow magni-
tudes, although uses a single rate of shipments (for the cur-
rent month, i =0),while k incorporates different, future rates.
Variations in shipments could have such patterns and be large
enough to make the estimates of U/S and k significantly different. How-
ever, for U.S. durable goods industries, our calculations show that this
is not the case. Chart 6-7 compares two estimates of the "average de-
livery periods" for these industries: the current ratio of unfilled orders
to shipments, U/S, and the Steuer-BaIl-Eaton measure of "waiting
time" defined above as k. The two series are closely similar, although
k is somewhat smoother than U/S and considerably less affected by
occasional large shocks such as the 1952 strike. While k is indeed con-
ceptually preferable to the ratio oftoit takes more time to com-
pute, and the return on these extra costs seems small. Hence only U/S
ratios are used elsewhere in this book. The results of the experiment
presented in Chart 6-7 are encouraging, since they suggest that much
the same broad conclusions are obtained from an analysis of the cur-
rent ratios as from a different and presumably better estimation method.
The observed backlog-shipment ratio clearly tells us nothing definite
about the magnitude of the lead of new orders relative to shipments.
Nevertheless, one might expect a positive association between the
size of the ratio and the average length of time that buyers have to wait
for delivery on orders currently placed. At least, changes in U/S over
31See M. D. Steuer, R. J. Ball and J. R. Eaton, "The Effect of Waiting Times on Foreign Orders
for Machine Tools," Econoniica,November1966, pp. 389—90.Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 283
Chart 6-7
Two Estimates of Delivery Periods, Durable Goods Industries,
1947—65
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles in the K index; triangles, the
UJSratio.Series are seasonally adjusted.
Source: Bureau of the Census.
time may serve as an approximation to changes in the average waiting
or delivery periods. Also, there is some reason to believe that a cross-
sectional relationship may exist: An industry that has a backlog of Un-
ifiled orders that is large relative to output and shipments is presum-
ably an industry in which production to order is important and delivery
periods are substantial. By the same token, an industry with low U/S
ratios is likely to have only a small proportion of its output made to
order.
Industry Averages for the Ratios and Lags
Comparisons of the average U/S ratios and the average leads of N
relative to S for the major manufacturing industries (Table 6-6) do
show some correspondence between the two sets of measures. Trans-
portation equipment has the highest ratios and the longest leads, while
the "other durables" group has the lowest ratios and the shortest leads
among the major components of the durable goods sector. Leather,
paper, and printing have very low U/S ratios and also, on the average,Table 6-6
Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations of Backlog-Shipment






Backlog-ShipmentRatios bat Turns in Orders at Turns
in Shipments
(mos.) NewOrders Shipments
P T P T P T
tistica (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ALL MANUFACTUR1NGd
M 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.4 3.8
Md 2.9 2.5 2 3
SD 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.9 2.9
DURABLE GOODS
M 3.8 3.4 3.6 3.2 5.6 4.6
Md 3.7 3.0 3.1 3.0 5 3
SD 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.5 4.6 3.8
PRIMARY METALSe
M 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.5 3.6 4.6
Md 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.0 3 3
SD 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.1 3.6 4.0
BLAST FURNACES, STEEL MILLSt
M 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.1 6.8 5.6
Md 3.0 2.6 2.0 2.0 3.5 3
SD 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.6 7.2 4.4
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
M 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.1 2.2 4.5
Md 2.9 3.1 2.8 2.7 2 4.5
SD 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 2.0 3.0
ELECT. MACHINERY8
M 4.5 4.8 4.4 4.9 2.5 1.2
Md 4.2 4.4 4.0 4.2 2.5 2.5
SD 1.0 1.6 1.1 2.0 1.7 3.7
MACHINERY EXC. ELECT.8
M 3.7 3.2 3.5 3.1 5.0 4.2
Md 3.7 3.1 3.5 3.1 3 5
SD 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.3 3.8 2.8
TRANSPORT. EQUIP.
M 6.5 6.4 5.6 6.0 2.2 3.8
Md 6.0 5.9 5.2 6.5 3 1
SD 2.1 1.1 1.6 1.1 5.2 4.7






atTurns in Orders at Turns
in Shipments
(mos.) NewOrders Shipments
P T P T P T
tistica (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OTHER DURABLE GOODSh
M 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.8 1.4
Md 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 0 0
SD 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 2.3 2.8
NONDURABLE GOODS'
M 1.4 1.0 1.3 0.9 3.4 2.8
Md 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.9 4 3
SD 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 2.8 2.0
TEXTILE-MILL
M 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.3 3.6 4.2
Md 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.2 4 5
SD 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 1.9 2.3
LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS1
M 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.6 4.0
Md 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 0 4
SD 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.2 1.0
PAPER AND ALLIED
M 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 3.5 (0.5)
Md 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 3.5 (0.5)
SD 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.5 2.5
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING1
M 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.0 (0.5)
Md 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 k k
SD 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.5
P =troughs.
T= peaks.
Note: The entries for the individual durable goods industries are based on the older
(pre-1963) OBE data for the period 1948—52 and on the new Census data (1963 revision)
for 1953—62. The entries for all manufacturing and for the durable goods aggregate are
based on the new data. The entries for the four individual nondurable goods industries
are based on the older data for 1948—6 1 only. The same series were used earlier in this
chapter for unfilled orders and shipments (see, e.g., Tables 6-1 and 6-2); the series for
new orders are of the same vintage and cover the same years.
a M =arithmeticmean; Md =median;SD =standarddeviation.286 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Notes to Table 6-6 (cbntinued)
bThedates of the turns are those used in the measures of the leads of new orders rela-
tive to shipments (the leads included in the averages of columns 5 and 6).
CAllthe figures denote average leads of new orders relative to shipments, except those
in parentheses, which are lags. The means (M) are the same as the corresponding en-
tries in Table 4-6, column 8, and in Appendix E, Table E-I, columns 11 and 12, lines
28—31, written without sign. See Tables 4-5 and E-1 for the full record of timing under-
lying these measures. The medians and standard deviations (Md, SD) are based on the
same observations as the means.
industries reporting unfilled orders; includes the durable goods industries and
the four major nondurable goods industries covered in the last twelve lines.
eThevalues of the UIS ratios at the 1952 troughs in new orders and shipments were
estimated by averaging over selected months (April, May, and September for the new
orders chronology and June—December for that of shipments) to dampen the effects of
the steel strike. In 1959, prestrike turns were used.
Data begin in 1953. In 1959, prestrike turns in N and S were used.
gBasedin part on unpublished data received from the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Office of Business Economics.
iiIncludesprofessional and scientific instruments; lumber; furniture; stone, clay, and
glass; and miscellaneous industries.
Includes textiles, leather, paper, and printing and publishing.
Based on unpublished OBE data for the period 1948—6 1.
kOnlytwo observations are available.
very short leads. These results do not depend greatly on whether the
U/S ratios are measured at their own turning points or at those of new
orders or shipments. In Table 6-6, ratios at turns in both new orders
and shipments are presented. Typically, the values of U/S are higher
at the turning points of N than at those of S but the differences are
small (compare columns 1 and 3, and columns 2 and 4).
It appears in several instances that the average leads show hap-
hazard interindustry differences, while the average U/S ratios yield
more systematic and meaningful results. The leads provide a fair basis
for discrimination only in the extreme cases. The correspondence be-
tween the industry ranks according to the two measures is also limited
to these cases.
General considerations suggest that no more than a loose associa-
tion may be expected between these two quite different and independ-
ently derived sets of estimates. One major reason lies in aggregation
over industries with different types of manufacture and different in-
cidence and lags of delivery. The observable timing relations between
N and S can be quite sensitive to the characteristics of the resultingUnfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 287
compositions.32 For example a major industry as diversified as elec-
trical machinery has large order backlogs for many products and thus
relatively high U/S ratios. At the same time, the lags of S behind N are
typically rather short in this industry, which may be caused by off-
setting effects of aggregation.
Further complications may arise because of vagaries in the course
of sales or new orders and the effects of the resulting uncertainty and
errors of prediction. In manufacture to stock, scheduling production
depends on expectations of market sales. When these turn bearish
early, production may well be curtailed with little delay, even if total
order backlogs for the industry's other products are still large. In fact,
it should be clear that large backlogs do not insure long lags of output
at peaks in new orders even in manufacture to order, except in the
probably rare cases where suppliers are committed to rigid production
schedules under large long-term contracts. Large backlogs do enable
firms to continue producing at high rates in the face of declines in
current demand, but when such declines are expected to be severe and
persistent enough, the0costs of maintaining the high rates of output will
appear greater than the costs of changing the rates. Production cut-
backs will then be made. Thus the short lags of the electrical machinery
shipments may also occasionally or in part reflect prompt reactions to
early changes in expectations of market sales.
The peak-trough differences in the ratios are generally small, often
inappreciable, and sometimes "perverse" in the sense that the peak
values are smaller than the trough ones (columns 1—2 and 3—4). Much
of this is due to discrepancies in timing between the ratios and either
new orders or shipments. The average lags of shipments show large
but by no means uniform or systematic differences between peaks and
troughs. For example, as noted in Chapter 4, some of the lags at
troughs were unusually long for particular reasons.
32Supposethat industry A sells all but one of its products from stock; the single item it makes to
order accounts for a small proportion of the value of its output but requires a long delivery period.
On the other hand, suppose industry B produces only to order, with sizable delivery periods for its
individual products; but the time patterns involved are such that the over-all average delivery period
for the value aggregates of all its products is short. Then industry A would have low U/Sratios,in
terms of values of total backlogs and shipments, and substantial lags of S behind N.Thisis because
for most of A's output NS, but for a small part of it, which alone determines the lag, the two vari-
ables differ and N precedes S by long intervals. Industry B would, on the contrary, have relatively
highU/Sratios and short lags of S behind N. This is because, by assumption, B has at any time a
large volume of advance orders to be processed but thedeliverylags on its products largely cancel
each other out, leavingshortaverage lags only in the relation between its aggregate new orders and
shipments.288 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Because of the limitations of data and measures, it seems inadvisable
to go into the detail of the comparisons by industry and type of turn.33
On the whole, the U/S ratios are far more stable and well-behaved than
the timing comparisons, which are particularly sensitive to irregular
and episodic influences. The ratios show much less dispersion than the
timing measures, as can be seen by comparing the respective standard
deviations and averages in Table 6-6. Hence the averages of the U/S
values are more representative of their distributions than are the aver-
ages of the N-S leads of theirs.
Table 6-7 presents measures of the same type for twenty-seven sub-
divisions of the durable goods sector. It was hoped that the difficulties
arising from aggregation would be somewhat reduced in these compari-
sons, which apply to more narrowly defined industrial categories. The
table is based on the older OBE data and has a simplified format.34
Both the average backlog-shipment ratios and the average leads of
new orders indicate substantial and apparently systematic differences
between the subdivisions of several major industries, namely, non-
electrical machinery, transportation equipment, and the other durables
group. It is significant that in each of these cases the two measures
identify the same component industries as having extreme ranks. Thus
metalworking machinery and engines and turbines have the highest
U/S ratios and the largest N-S leads, while office and store machines,
agricultural implements, and household appliances are at the other end
in either ranking. Aircraft ranks high and motor vehicles low according
to either measure. Among the "other durables," only one subdivision
has high average U/S values —professionaland scientific investments
—and this is also the only industry in the group that shows long lags of
shipments behind new orders.
The main counterexample is electrical machinery, where the rela-
tively high backlog-shipment ratios observed before for the group as a
whole appear to be common to all three subdivisions, while the order
leads are on the average short.
"is little doubt that errors of measurement adversely affect the present results. In particular,
the combination of low U/S ratios and relatively long lags of S behind N may arise partly from over-
estimation of the lags at turning points.
Forthe U/S ratios, only the values at turns in shipments are used (the corresponding measures
at turns are very similar). The means and the medians of the ratios differ little, too, and
only the former are included.Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 289
The Relations Over Tune
The cross-sectional hypothesis —thatthose industries which have
high (low) average U/S ratios would also tend to have relatively long
(short) average leads of new orders relative to shipments —turnedout
to have some limited support in the data. Its counterpart for time series
is that, over the cycle, long leads of N relative to S would occur when
the U/S ratio for the given industry is high, and short leads when the
ratio is low. This, too, is unlikely to be a regularly observable relation-
ship for several reasons, some already noted, and others noted below.
The vagaries of individual observations are particularly troublesome
here, since the analysis is concerned directly with comparisons at suc-
cessive turns rather than with averages. But more is involved than
technical difficulties of estimation. The relative timing of new orders,
output, and shipments depends on other systematic factors in addition
to the rates of capacity utilization and the size of backlogs. Expecta-
tions influence the speed and strength of reactions to changes in de-
mand, while being themselves affected by the size and other character-
istics of current and earlier changes.
The greater and the more sustained the change in demand, the more
definite the expectations and the stronger the response. This point
seems reasonable on a priori grounds and also consistent with the evi-
dence. Thus the reaction of the industry to a sluggish and hesitant
reversal in new orders would tend to be slower or weaker than the
reaction to a more decisive and visible reversal. A related influence is
the size of the changes before the turn. Consider a recovery preceded
by large declines in new orders and much smaller declines in shipments
(which implies a sizable backlog decumulation). In this case, new
orders have relatively low levels at the upturn and for some time there-
after, and backlogs continue to be reduced; whether or not incoming
business will regain its strength is still uncertain, and as long as this is
so, output and delivery rates are more likely just to be stabilized than
appreciably increased. The developments in 1953—54 illustrate this.
At the 1953 peaks, the lags of shipments behind new orders were
generally shorter than at the 1954 troughs. Backlogs were ample,
absolutely and relative to shipments, throughout this period, but they
were larger in 1953 than in 1954. In 1953, the declines of new orders
were large and steep, from levels about equal to those of shipments. InTable 6-7
Average Ratios of Unfilled Orders to Shipments and Average Leads
of New Orders at Peaks and Troughs of Shipments, by Subdivisions
of Durable Manufactures, 1948—61
Value of U/S
Ratios at Turns Timing cofNew Orders




Mean tion MeandMedian tion
Industrya (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary metals
Iron and steel (5, 5) 3.2 0.8 2.2 2 1.6
3.2 1.3 4.4 1 4.6
Primary nonferrous metals (5, 5) 1.5 0.2 1.2 1 1.7
1.7 0.4 (0.8) 0 1.2
Other primary metals (5, 5) 2.6 0.8 3.4 3 2.7
2.5 1.2 3.4 3 2.2
Fabricated metal products e
Heatingand plumbing (2, 2) 3.6 0.4 (0.5) 1.5
5.0 0.4 6.0 2.0
Structural metal work (2, 2) 2.4 0.9 2.0 5.0
1.9 0.4 5.0 1.0
Tin cans and other (2, 2) 1.6 0.2 2.5 0.5
1.4 0.2 1.5 0.5
Electrical machinery
Electrical generator apparatus
(4,4) 5.5 1.3 0.2 1 3.3
5.7 0.4 0.8 1.5 5.0
Radio,TV,andequipment(5,5) 5.5 2.1 (0.8) 0 1.9
7.2 2.5 1.8 2 3.2
Otherelectricalequipment(5,5) 4.3 1.5 1.2 0 1.9
4.9 0.7 6.5 7.5 4.0
Machinery except electrical
Metalworking machinery (2, 3) 6.8 2.0 14.0 14 1.0
3.4 0.7 8.0 6 6.7
General machinery (5, 5) 5.4 1.3 4.0 5 3.9
5.6 1.3 4.6 4 L7
Specialmachinery (4, 4) 4.4 1.1 5.5 5.5 0.5
4.0 2.1 5.3 7 3.9
Engines and turbines (4, 3) 5.7 0.5 16.3 20 7.4
7.4 1.4 3.5 2.5 2.7
Construction machinery (4, 5) 3.5 1.2 6.5 8 3.8
3.1 1.1 2.8 1 3.1
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Table 6-7 (concluded)
Value of U/S
Ratios at Turns Timing eofNew Orders




Mean tion MeandMedian tion
Industry a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Machinery except electrical (cont.)
Officeandstoremachines(4,5) 1.8 0.3 3.3 4 0.9
1.9 0.3 0.8 —0.5 3.8
Agricultural implements (4, 4) 2.8 0.7 1.0 1 0.7
3.1 0.8 1.3 1 1.2
Household and service appli-
ances (6, 6) 2.6 0.5 2.7 4 2.6
3.1 0.9 3.5 1.5 4.4
Other machinery and parts (3,4) 4.3 0.9 4.7 5 3.7
3.8 0.6 4.5 5 1.5
Transportation equipment
Motor vehicles (6, 6) 1.0 1.0 3.8 2 6.5
1.9 1.8 3.4 2.5 4.1
Motor vehicle parts and acces-
sories (6, 6) 3.8 1.3 4.6 4 2.7
3.6 1.4 3.0 1 3.8
Aircraft (3, 3) 14.7 3.4 12.0 2.0
17.5 4.3 11.0 g
Othernonautomotive transpor-
tation equipment (3,4) 6.5 2.0 6.5
r 1.5
6.6 1.5 9.0 12 4.2
Other durable goods industries
Lumber (2, 3)11 0.7 0.2 2.0 2.0
0.8 0.5 0.7 1 0.5
Furniture (2, 3)11 0.8 0.2 1.0 1.0
0.9 0.2 0.3 0 0.5
Stone, clay, and glass products
(5,5) 1.4 0.3 1.2 3 2.7
1.5 0.3 0.4 0 3.2
Professional and scientific in-
struments (3, 3)h 5.8 0.9 7.0 1.0
5.7 0.2 7.7 7 2.5
Miscellaneous including ord-
nance (3, 3)h 1.4 0.7 0 r 2.0
1.2 0.3 0.3 —1 1.9292 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Notesto Table 6-7
aThefirst figure in parentheses gives the number of observations ott the U/Sratiosat
peaks; the second, the number at troughs.
Foreach item, the entry on the first line is for peaks; the entry on the second line,
for troughs.
AH the figures in columns 3 and 4 denote average leads of new orders relative to
shipments, except those in parentheses, which are lags.
ciSameas the correspDnding entries in Appendix E, Table E-1, columns 11 and 12,
written without sign. See that table for the full record of timing underlying these
measures. The medians and standard deviations in columns 4 and 5 are based on the
same observations as the means.
The series on unfilled orders for the components of the fabricated metals industry
begin in 1955.
Only two observations are available.
Only one observation is available.
hTheseries on unfilled orders for these industries begin in 1953.
1954, new orders moved up hesitantly from levels well below those of
shipments.
All possible obstacles notwithstanding, rank correlations between
the successively observed lags of shipments behind new orders and
the corresponding U/S ratios are positive for most of the durable goods
industries. For the durables aggregates, Spearman's correlation coeffi-
cients, adjusted for tied ranks, are .648 and .836, depending on whether
the ratios are measured at turns in new orders or at turns in shipments.
For transportation equipment, the corresponding coefficients are .607
and .621; for fabricated matals, .548 and .388; and for blast furnaces
and steel mills (since 1953), .603 and .230. In the first two cases, both
figures are significant; in the others, at least the larger figure in each
pair is.35 However, the rank correlations for the other major compo-
nents of the durable goods sector are low enough to be of doubtful or
no significance.36
Evidence supporting the relationship is provided by data for individ-
ual industries, which go back to the years before World War II. Table
Predominantly positive results were also obtained in earlier calculations based on the older (pre-
1963) data. For the averages of seven major industries, the rank correlation is .64; for the averages
of twenty-seven industrial subdivisions, it is .60. These measures use U/S ratios taken at turns in
new orders; when the ratios at the turns in shipments are used instead, somewhat lower correlations
(of .57 and .52, respectively) are obtained.
Thesignificance points for rankings of ten or fewer items are given in BiometrikaTables for
Statisticians,Vol. 1, ed. E. S. Pearson and H. 0. Hartley, Cambridge, 1958, Table 44, p. 211.Unfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 293
Table 6-8
Rank Correlations Between Leads of New Orders, Backlog-Shipment
Ratios, and Related Measures, Five Industries, 1919—56
Timing Measures Coefficients of Rank
Correlation CBetween
New Orders Timing Measures and
Relative
to Ship- Number Ratio: Production
ments (S) of Paired U/S as Per
or Produc- Period Observa- or Cent of
tion (Z) Covered a tionsb U/Z Capacity
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Steel sheets S 1919—32 9 0.50 0.63
Woodworking
machinery S 1923—38 10 0.44
Furniture S 1926—45 8 0.33
Paperboard Z 1926—56 17 0.31
d 0.52
Oak flooring S 1918—54 19 0.11
a Identifiesthe dates of the first and of the last turning point in shipments or produc-
tion.
IiEqualsthe number of ranks used in the correlations; refers to the periods listed in
column 2.
CSpearman'scoefficient adjusted for the presence of "ties" or duplicated rank stand-
ings. The underlying data are three-month averages centered on the month of turn in
shipments or production, as indicated in column 1. Backlogs =U.
dCorrelationbetween the leads of new orders relative to output (see column 1) and
ratios of backlogs to output (U/Z).
6-8 shows that the correlations between the leads of new orders and
the corresponding U/S ratios are all positive for these limited materials.
For one industry, paperboard, production rather than shipment figures
were used, with similar results.
The leads of new orders are also positively correlated with the rates
of capacity utilization in the given industry at the turning points. These
correlations are somewhat higher than those with the backlog-shipment
(or backlog-output) ratios (cf. cols. 4 and 5).
While none of these associations is close, their consensus in sign is
not likely to be accidental. It supports the presumption that the lags of
production behind orders tend to be longer, the larger the relative size
of backlogs and the higher the capacity utilization.294 Causes and Implications of Changes in Unfilled Orders and Inventories
Summary
Unfilled orders (U) would be expected to move in the same direction as
the business cycle, since there is a tendency for new orders (N) to ex-
ceed shipments (S) in expansions and for N <Sin contractions; also,
U should lag behind N, whereas its timing relative to S would probably
be roughly coincident. However, this scheme is partly oversimplified
because of the implicit treatment of the order backlogs as merely a
product of the past history of N and S without any active influence of
its own. Actually, backlog movements can themselves strongly affect
the scheduling of production and the timing of shipments. Where the
backlogs are large and the delivery periods are long, production and
shipments are concerned in a large measure with old orders on hand
rather than with current orders; that is, they then depend relatively
more on U and less on N. At high peak levels of U, the lags of S would
often be long, since an ample stock of orders can sustain production
for some time, even when the current order receipts are declining (wit-
ness the wartime and postwar developments in 1917—18 and 1942—48).
Where backlogs are small, either because the typical delivery periods
are short or because production is largely to stock, they are likely to
behave less systematically and their relation to shipments may be
rather loose. In the decade 1952—62, following the build-up of the
Korean War period, backlogs had horizontal or downward trends and
drastically reduced cyclical movements. At both the peaks and troughs
of this period, unfilled orders have for the most part had either rough
coincidences or lags relative to the corresponding shipments series.
Afterward, long upward movements have reasserted themselves in
the order backlogs of durable goods industries, and shipments show
again a sizable lag at the recent peak of these backlogs in 1969.
The U/S ratios have a time dimension and provide some indications
of the changing average duration of delivery lags. The ratios for the
durable goods sector have been declining most of the time in the years
1953—63 (from levels of 6.0 or more to about 2.5). Afterward, through
1969, they were generally larger (mostly close to 3.0, with a high of 3.5
in October 1967), but still much lower than in the 1950's. For most of
the industries, cyclical fluctuations of U/S resemble those of U but are
smaller. The U/S ratios often lag behind total backlogs at troughs, butUnfilled Orders and Industrial Activity 295
coincidewith or lead backlogs at peaks. This conforms to expectations:
Demand pressures reach their greatest intensity before aggregate out-
put peaks, but revival of production at low levels of capacity utiliza-
tion does not imply an immediate lengthening of the average delivery
or waiting times.
The average size of backlogs differs greatly among the industries: It
is, of course, large for durable goods and small for nondurables (the
latter account for no more than 5—7 per cent of total unfilled orders of
manufacturers). The U/S ratios show similar interindustry differences.
In the durable goods sector, transportation equipment has the highest
average ratios; electrical and nonelectrical machinery rank second and
third; fabricated and primary metals, fourth and fifth; and other dur-
ables show the lowest ratios. In terms of market categories, defense
products show the highest U/S figures, followed in descending order
by machinery and equipment, materials, and consumer goods.
An industry with a high (low) average U/S ratio is probably an in-
dustry with a large (small) proportion of output accounted for by ad-
vance orders that have long delivery periods. This, however, does not
imply that a close relation must exist between these ratios and the
average lags of S relative to N at turning points, because of the disturb-
ing effects of uncertainty about the future course of sales, of aggrega-
tion, of other measurement errors, etc. Actually the hypothesis of a
positive association between these two quite different and independ-
ently derived sets of estimates does receive a modest degree of sup-
port from the data. Also, rank correlations between the successively
observed lags of shipments at turns in new orders and the corresponding
U/S ratios are typically positive although not high.